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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
  ____________ 
 
No. 17-2220 
____________ 
 
D. RICHARD TONGE; JUST NEW HOMES, INC., 
                       Appellants 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF NEW JERSEY;  
NEW JERSEY REAL ESTATE COMMISSION 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.N.J. No. 3-16-cv-01319) 
District Judge: Honorable Peter G. Sheridan 
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
September 7, 2018 
 
Before: HARDIMAN, KRAUSE, and BIBAS, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: September 11, 2018) 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
                                                 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
 2 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 D. Richard Tonge and Just New Homes, Inc. (collectively, Tonge) appeal the 
District Court’s order dismissing their complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 
Because Tonge’s claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment, we will affirm. 
I 
 Tonge was licensed as a real estate broker in New Jersey. He attracted customers 
by offering incentives that apparently ran afoul of New Jersey law. The New Jersey Real 
Estate Commission initiated disciplinary action in 2005, and five years later entered a 
final order revoking Tonge’s real estate license and imposing a fine of $123,500. The 
Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court affirmed, and the Supreme Court of 
New Jersey declined to hear Tonge’s case. 
 In 2016, Tonge filed this suit against the Commission and the State of New Jersey 
in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey. He asserted several 
causes of action, each of which rested on one basic claim. Tonge had argued to the 
Commission that New Jersey regulators had already approved his practices as part of an 
earlier settlement agreement. But the Commission found no such agreement or approval 
ever existed. The Appellate Division deemed this finding supported by the “undisputed 
record,” Supp. App. 44, but Tonge’s federal complaint alleged the Commission had 
procured that result by fraudulently “misrepresenting, denying, omitting or concealing the 
existence of a settlement agreement . . . confirm[ing] that [Tonge’s] . . . business operated 
lawfully.” App. 744 (Am. Compl. ¶ 1). 
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 The District Court dismissed Tonge’s initial complaint for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction but granted leave to amend. Tonge did so, but the Court found his amended 
complaint did not differ materially from his first effort, and again dismissed his case, this 
time with prejudice. Ruling from the bench, the District Court determined it lacked 
jurisdiction under both the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and the Eleventh Amendment to the 
United States Constitution. This appeal followed. 
II1
 We agree that the Eleventh Amendment deprived the District Court of jurisdiction 
over Tonge’s suit. The Eleventh Amendment “bar[s] all private suits against non-
consenting States in federal court.” Karns v. Shanahan, 879 F.3d 504, 512 (3d Cir. 2018) 
(quoting Lombardo v. Pa. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 540 F.3d 190, 194 (3d Cir. 2008)). 
“[W]here . . . the Eleventh Amendment precludes a suit, the court in which the plaintiff 
filed the action lacks subject matter jurisdiction.” Baltimore Cty. v. Hechinger 
Liquidation Tr. (In re Hechinger Inv. Co. of Del., Inc.), 335 F.3d 243, 249 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(citing Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 64 (1996)).  
 This means New Jersey is amenable to private suit in federal court only to the 
extent it has waived or Congress has abrogated its immunity, neither of which occurred 
here. Tonge suggests he can vindicate his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, but 
                                                 
1 In the District Court, Tonge asserted jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We 
have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Since this case comes to us on a 
motion to dismiss, we accept as true Tonge’s well-pleaded factual allegations, and 
“review de novo the legal grounds underpinning [Defendants’] claim of . . . [Eleventh 
Amendment] immunity.” Karns v. Shanahan, 879 F.3d 504, 512 (3d Cir. 2018) (citations 
omitted). 
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the ratification of that amendment did not itself open the States up to suit. Rather, Section 
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment empowered Congress to abrogate New Jersey’s Eleventh 
Amendment immunity, but it has not done so with respect to Tonge’s claims. See Karns, 
879 F.3d at 519 (citations omitted) (noting that States are not “persons” for purposes of 
42 U.S.C. § 1983). 
 Nor may Tonge sue the Commission in federal court. In addition to States 
themselves, the Eleventh Amendment also protects “those entities that are so intertwined 
with them as to render them ‘arms of the state.’” Id. at 512–13 (citation omitted). We 
have little trouble concluding that the Commission, a division of the New Jersey 
Department of Insurance—the members of which are appointed and removable by the 
Governor of New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:15-5, and the surplus revenues of which 
flow to the state treasury, id. § 45:1-3—is an arm of the State of New Jersey for Eleventh 
Amendment purposes. See Karns, 879 F.3d at 512–19. 
 Finally, Tonge contends he should have been allowed to amend his complaint a 
second time to add claims against Commission officials in their individual capacities. It is 
settled law that a District Court does not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend 
where the plaintiff makes a cursory request without providing a proposed amended 
complaint. Ramsgate Court Townhome Ass’n v. West Chester Borough, 313 F.3d 157, 
161 (3d Cir. 2002). Tonge requested a second chance to replead only in passing at oral 
argument, stating that “an amendment is not futile, because we could add the state 
officials.” Supp. App. 69. Absent more, the Court “had nothing upon which to exercise 
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its discretion,” and we will not disturb its decision to deny leave to amend. Ramsgate, 
313 F.3d at 161. 
* * * 
 Because we will affirm the dismissal of Tonge’s complaint on Eleventh 
Amendment grounds, we do not reach the separate question of whether it was also barred 
by Rooker-Feldman. 
